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The seeming consistency of these findings in several Western countries, above all the United States, has led some to generalize this relationship. One of the clearest statements of this view is given by Lipset:
Data gathered by public opinion research agencies which have questioned people in different countries about their beliefs on tolerance for the opposition, their attitudes toward ethnic or racial minorities, and their feelings for multi-party as against one-party systems have showed that the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from the others has been education. The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices (39-40). And Lipset's view from twenty years ago is still widely held today. A recent study of tolerance in America in the 1970s cites this passage and concludes that "this assessment continues to describe research evidence accurately in 1977" (Nunn et al., 58) .
To substantiate his claim, Lipset makes an explicit comparison between the U.S. and Germany. In his well-known (and still controversial) chapter on "Working-Class Authoritarianism" in Political Man, he cites evidence on tolerance for the rights of dissidents to speak publicly in the United States and evidence on support for a more-than-one party system in Germany to illustrate the theory that the better educated are more democratic, more liberal, or less authoritarian than the rest of the population (100-3, cf. Tables 3 and 4) .
It is well known, however, that the use of different indicators to measure the same phenomenon across time or place is a tricky business. In this case, one could argue that these two items-dissidents' right of free speech and approval of multi-party systems-measure different things, acceptance of liberal values and support for democratic institutions. The distinction is not trivial, although it may not appear obvious from the perspective of a long-established liberal democracy. Especially in newer democracies, adherence to the regime form and its institutions may simply be part of an otherwise undemocratic citizen's loyalty to the state: liberal values like tolerance may not be part of this ideological package. Nor need this distinction necessarily be limited to new regimes which aspire to liberal democratic status. For example, it is theoretically possible to have an illiberal democracy of a Rousseauist or communist type a danger clearly recognized by Tocqueville and J. S. Mill in their discussions of the "tyranny of the majority"-in which a majority allows no deviations or dissent from its decisions; and although we may feel that the definition of democracy is thereby stretched, balanced defenses of this distinction have also been made with reference to contemporary empirical cases (Lindblom) . 1 If this distinction is correct, then there need be no necessary correspondence in the pattern of association between democratic and liberal measures; and there is no necessary basis for concluding that if the better educated in Germany support a more-than-one party system, they will also tend to be more tolerant of the speaking rights of dissidents. Indeed, Almond and Verba's 1959 multi-nation survey failed to find positive associations between higher education levels and certain deeper aspects of liberal democratic political culture in West Germany (105, 151-3); and Muller et al. found on the basis of a 1974 cross-national survey that West Germany deviated from several other Western democracies in its lack of association between level of education and support for the freedom of assembly (cf. Olsen and Baden). To my knowledge, no investigator has seen a consistent pattern of West German exceptionalism in these results or been prepared to offer more than a tentative explanation when the finding is noted in isolated cases. As I will suggest in the concluding discussion, however, there may be important historical reasons why better educated Germans are no more tolerant than worse educated Germans.
The data on tolerance in America which Lipset cites, as do a great many other writers on the topic, derive from Samuel Stouffer's 1954 survey, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, perhaps the earliest such investigation whose results are still comparable to present investigations (cf. Adorno et al.). Stouffer's central conclusions have formed a benchmark from which to build our expectations about the structure of tolerance in a western population: "The data showed that the older generation was less tolerant of nonconformists than the younger generation; also, that within each group the less educated were less tolerant than the better educated" (107). And several independent American replications of all or part of Stouffer's surveys in the 1970s (Davis, a; Nunn et al.) have established that (1) Stouffer's findings about generation and education still hold true, and (2) there has been a considerable aggregate increase in levels of measured tolerance in the American population since the 1950s, partly due to the replacement of older, less tolerant generations by younger, more tolerant generations, who are also better educated and therefore more tolerant; and partly due to a residual historical change in popular attitudes which cannot be accounted for by generation replacement and/or higher levels of It was desired to test the effects on tolerance of generation, education, social class, and political orientation on tolerance. I define generations as birth cohorts, and for this analysis, four cohorts are used, those who reached age 21 (an arbitrary age of "political maturity") before 1933, those who became 21 in 1933-48, those who became 21 in 1949-65, and those who have become 21 since 1965. Level of education was defined by comparable levels of certification-a middle level and a high level, yielding three groups-those with less than a mittlere Reifelhigh school diploma, those with this certificate but not an Abitur or college diploma, and those with an Abitur/college diploma or higher. Occupation of the head of household was used as a measure of social class, with manual workers representing the working class; professionals together with the self-employed (for Germany) or managers (for the U.S.) representing the old middle class; and other white-collar workers representing the new middle class; those in the agricultural sector were excluded from the analysis. Variables for partypolitical orientation were used for both countries-in the U.S. a party identification question and for Germany a hypothetical vote intention if there were an election next Sunday. The right was represented by American Republicans and German Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU), the left by the Democrats in the U.S. and the Social Democrats in Germany, and the center or residual group by Independent identifiers in America and by FDP voters and those who chose no party in Germany; supporters of other parties in Germany (mainly radical and ecology parties; a very small percentage) were excluded from the analysis. Finally, the response categories for the German tolerance items were dichotomized to correspond to the American formulation (a tolerant and an intolerant response). The two items available at both times were combined to make a scale, and a tolerant response to both items was considered necessary to code a tolerant response; other responses were classified as less tolerant. A three-item scale was also tested for the late 1970s (for both countries) and a six-item Guttman scale was tested for Germany alone (for both time points), but the results were very similar to the two-item scales and will not be reported here. Those expressing no opinion on any tolerance item were excluded from the analyses. The sample distributions of the variables used here are shown in Table 1 .
Analyses
We can systematically investigate the relationships among the variables used here by making complete cross-tabulations of them for each period and for each country, combining the multivariate contingency tables and treating time and country each as variables, and analyzing the resulting contingency tables with a series of log-linear models. Models were thus fitted to two basic kinds of contingency tables, those with the tolerance items combined into scales, and those with each separate tolerance item included in the table. (Since these contingency tables are very large and virtually impossible to inspect visually, they will not be presented here.) The procedure was followed of first considering the ideology variable(s) as dependent with the contingency table collapsed over party preference, and then including party preference as the ultimate dependent variable. Thus, the model-building assumes a causal ordering of the variables and proceeds in a recursive fashion from the beginning to the end of the causal chain; but since we will not be concerned with the relationships among the predictor variables, we concentrate only on the last and next-to-last steps of the chain. Following Goodman's modified path analysis technique (ch. 11), the predictor variables are controlled by including an interaction term of all possible associations among them at each modeling step. Finally, although standard methods of hierarchical model-building are used (Fienberg, a; Goodman), two criteria are used to determine goodness of fit: Free Speech / 979 whether the model as a whole provides an adequate fit, and whether individual interaction terms are statistically significant (i.e., add significantly to the overall fit) when tested at the appropriate modeling stage. Since the X2 statistics have been divided by two to allow for clustering in the sample designs, the overall fit tends to yield overly parsimonious models when judged in relation to the test of significance of individual interaction terms, which in this case are probably more reliable (see Fienberg, b, 25) . The processes of model fitting will not be shown in full here in order to save space, but the results are available from the author on request: although model fitting occupies the bulk of the methodological literature on log-linear models, the reader of substantive research is usually most interested in the final results, and that will be the focus here.
THE TOLERANCE SCALES
The effect parameters for the final fitted models for the contingency table using tolerance scales are shown in Table 2 : the first column of Table 2 980 / Social Forces Volume 60:4, June 1982 shows the parameters for the pooled contingency table, and the last four columns show the parameters for similar tables disaggregated by year and country (see Goodman, ch. 12, on this sort of disaggregation).
We are most interested to know whether there is a cross-national difference in the relation of education to tolerance, that is, whether a country-education-tolerance interaction is statistically signficiant. We directly test the null hypothesis that this interaction is not statistically significant by comparing appropriate "adjacent" models-which differ only Free Speech I 981 in that one includes and the other excludes this interaction-but tests show that it is highly significant (X2 = 27.41, with 2 df) and that it explains at least an additional 6 percent of the variation relative to the baseline model (in which none of the predictor variables has an effect on tolerance). We therefore reject the null hypothesis and note that the relationship of education to tolerance differs between the two countries. We can investigate the nature of the education-tolerance variation by country by examining the directions and magnitudes of the significant interaction parameters, shown in Table 2 . A glance at these results reinforces the conclusion that while the better educated in the United States are much more tolerant than the less well educated, virtually no such relationship exists in West Germany. This can be seen by adding the appropriate country component of the country-education-tolerance interaction term to the base educationtolerance effect parameter: for the U.S. this procedure yields a spread about zero above .50, while for Germany the spread is under .20; and by examining the education-tolerance interactions directly for each year and country in the last four columns: for the U.S. the figures remain about .50, but for Germany we again see that there is no significant association between education and tolerance in 1970, although a statistically significant interaction emerges in 1979 with a spread about zero of .25. A direct test of the hypothesis that the education-tolerance association is converging in the two countries over time in the 1970s, however, showed no statistically significant effect. On the other hand, tests I conducted on other dependent variables have also indicated the possible emergence of an educationtolerance association in Germany in the late 1970s (tests not shown here). Thus, we must perhaps modify the above conclusion because although educational level had virtually no effect on measured tolerance in Germany in the early 1970s, a small relationship appears to emerge in the late 1970s along the lines of the American pattern.
The results in Table 2 also indicate that the magnitude of the cohort effect on tolerance is roughly the same as that of education, but that there are no significant differences between the two countries nor changes during the 1970s. The younger generations are more tolerant than the older. Other testing, however (not shown), indicates that this generational effect has possibly become stronger in the United States since the 1950s. In a test using a similarly constructed scale of tolerance for the speaking rights of nonconformists (Stouffer data), the cohort-tolerance effect has a spread about zero of .20 in 1954 and about .40 in 1972-74; but since there is no significant year-cohort-tolerance interaction effect, this change is probably due to the historical entry of new generations with different levels of tolerance, rather than differential changes in the tolerance levels of the cohorts measured at both times. These findings parallel a number of my findings for Germany (not shown), where longer time series allowed me to investigate generational change in liberal attitudes since the early 1950s.5 They suggest that if a longer time series for the present tolerance items were available, we might also find an increase in generational correlations in Germany since the 1950s.
A few final features of Table 2 deserve mention. The first is that a small but statistically significant association appears between occupation and tolerance in the pooled table (first column), with the higher social class levels more tolerant than the workers, and this association also appears irregularly in the disaggregated tables (last four columns). We will later be able to locate the source of this association in one of the tolerance items in the scales; but for now we simply observe that this result is weakly at variance with a previous analysis of the German data alone (using a sixitem scale; not shown) where no such significant association was found, but that it follows roughly the same pattern as in an analysis of the American data above for the period 1954 to 1972-74 (not shown). This result clearly supports Lipset's well-known theory of "working-class authoritarianism" (ch. 4), but when education and cohort are taken into account, it is also clear that social class (as measured by occupation) has only a weak residual relationship to tolerance. Under this test, working-class authoritarianism, while observable, is only a marginal phenomenon. 6 Second, once all other factors in the table are taken into account, there are only very small differences in levels of measured tolerance between the two countries: the greatest part of the apparent difference between countries in the aggregate percentages in Table 1 can be accounted for by differential relationships of education to tolerance. That is, it would seem that Germans give more tolerant aggregate responses on the scale because the less well educated there respond about as tolerantly as do the better educated in both countries. Third, there is no significant change during the 1970s in the level of tolerance as measured by the scales: we find no evidence at this point of a posited rise in neoconservatism understood as a decline of liberal tolerance (cf. Davis, b). Finally, these tolerance scales are statistically unrelated to party preference. The effects of left-right or liberal-conservative self-identification were also tested (not shown; results available from the author), and although there was a tiny association, it did not appear to be ideological, for the centrists expressed least tolerance (cf.
Sullivan et al., a).7 DISAGGREGATED TOLERANCE ITEMS
Up to this point we have analyzed a scale of tolerance items in order to summarize a larger body of information and also to tap an underlying dimension of tolerance, if possible, by referring to nonconformist speakers of varying ideologies. We now disaggregate this scale into its constituent parts to see whether any of the correlates of tolerance thus far determined can be localized within one or another subrealm. We thus compute and Free Speech I 983 analyze a second contingency table for both countries and for both time points with occupation, cohort, and education, items measuring tolerance for an atheist speaker and for a communist speaker, and in some tests, party preference as a dependent variable; and also a third contingency table for both countries, but only for the later 1970s, including occupation, cohort, and education, items measuring tolerance for an atheist speaker, for a communist speaker, and for a neo-Nazi speaker, and in some tests, left-right self-placement as an intervening variable. (Remember that these contingency tables are not shown here, as noted at the beginning of the "Analysis" section.) The effect parameters for the final fitted models are shown in Table 3 We again proceed thematically, examining the impact of each independent variable in turn. First, however, we should note that the separate dependent tolerance items are themselves highly related. In fact, the associations between them are the strongest observed: the association between the atheist and communist items in the second contingency table alone explains 47 percent of the variation relative to the base model, and the associations among the three tolerance items in the third contingency table explain about as much. There is also evidence that the association between the atheist and communist items is stronger in the U.S. than in Germany, but the effect is of small magnitude (.05) and it explains less than 1 percent additional variation relative to the base model. Second, we should also note that left-right self-placement is never importantly related to any of the tolerance items in the third contingency table: the strongest such association, with tolerance for a communist speaker, is only statistically significant at the .10 level. Since model fitting on this table used so much computer time, the table was collapsed over left-right self-placement in order to obtain a smaller less expensive table, and testing proceeded from the basis of the results obtained to this point. (This procedure is justified by the so-called collapsibility theorem, see Bishop et al., 47.) Beginning again with the relationship between education and tolerance, we recall that although education had a large impact on the tolerance scale in the U.S. samples, it had virtually none in the 1970 German sample, but a small effect in the 1979 German sample did appear in the direction of the American results. A glance at the results for the scale items in Table 3 , however, suggests that these relationships are unevenly distributed in the different realms of tolerance tested: tolerance in the religious realm differs somewhat from tolerance in the political realm, and these relationships vary from country to country. Since the results are fairly complex, we examine them item by item. 
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Tolerance of an Atheist Speaker
There are no significant differences between the countries here, although an examination of the insignificant interaction effects (not shown) suggests that the relationship between education and the atheist item is slightly stronger in the U.S. than in Germany. Likewise, in the second contingency table there is no significant temporal change in this association in the final model, although it attains statistical significance at an earlier stage of modelfitting: more importantly, however, the results for the second contingency table disaggregated by year suggests that in the early 1970s the interaction had a spread about zero of .26, but by the late 1970s the interaction had become statistically insignificant (see the third and the fifth columns in Table 3 ). In the third contingency table for the late 1970s, the association between education and the atheist item is also statistically insignificant. Again, however, an examination of the insignificant interaction term (not shown) suggests that the association did not shrink so much in the U.S. as it did in Germany during the 1970s.
Tolerance of a Communist Speaker
Here we see a significant difference between the countries in the early 1970s but not in the late 1970s; that is, there is a process of convergence in the impact of education on tolerance of a communist speaker. By adding the appropriate effect parameters in Table 3 Tolerance for a Neo-Nazi Speaker This item is available for both countries only in the late 1970s. There is a statistically significant difference in the association with education between the two countries, and by performing the same sort of additions in Table 3 , we find that the interaction has a magnitude of .39 for the U.S. in 1977 and .02 for Germany in 1979.
Thus, (1) the association between education and tolerance is somewhat stronger in the political than in the religious realm, (2) the associations remain fairly constant in the U.S. throughout the 1970s, and (3) the associations are rather low in Germany during the 1970s, but a relationship emerges with the communist item in 1979 which probably accounts for the small effect in the scale scores noted above. This latter finding has more than methodological significance, however: it suggests that if orthodox Western political culture is spreading in Germany, it is beginning with the extension of political tolerance among the better educated to left extremists. Tolerance of the speaking rights of right-wing extremists among the better educated may take longer because of still-unresolved problems in German political culture in dealing with the Nazi past.8
Examining generational effects next, we see that cohort has its greatest impact on tolerance for an atheist speaker, somewhat less impact on tolerance for a left or right radical political speaker, and that the young are 986 / Social Forces Volume 60:4, June 1982 always more tolerant than the old; however, unlike the association with education, there are no cross-national differences in the relationship between cohort and tolerance. In the second contingency table, for instance, the interaction between cohort and the atheist item explains an additional 15 percent of the variation relative to the base model, while the interaction between cohort and the communist item only explains an additional 2 percent of this variation. In general, the effect parameters for the atheist item in Table 3 have a spread about zero of at least .35, while the parameters for the political items mostly remain under .15 in magnitude. It is, of course, usual to find that the effects of secularization appear strongly across generations, but on the basis of testing other variables (not shown), I rather expected an equally strong impact of cohort on political tolerance: perhaps generational effects on political tolerance emerge most clearly when the test is a more difficult one, like a scale which requires expressed tolerance of both ends of the political spectrum simultaneously.
A handful of observations remain to be made about the correlates of the tolerance items in the second and third contingency tables. The first is the association between occupation and tolerance. The disaggregation of the scales shows clearly that, at least in these data, any working-class intolerance is not political authoritarianism, but at most a kind of clericalism or fundamentalism, for there are only significant associations between class (occupation) and religious tolerance, none with political tolerance. Furthermore, these interactions for the tolerance items explain even less of the variations (1 or 2 percent) relative to their base models than did the interaction for the tolerance scale.
The second observation concerns party preference. In contrast to the tests of the tolerance scale, which found no significant association between tolerance and party preference, a very small but highly significant association was found for the communist item when the scale was disaggregated into its constituent parts (these effects not shown in Table 3 ). Social Democratic supporters in Germany and political Independents in the U.S. are somewhat more tolerant than average of a communist's right to speak publicly, but the whole interaction accounts for only 2 percent of the variation over the base model, and the effect parameters are tiny in magnitude. One should not make much of such a small association, but we might note that while there seems to be some partisan solidarity on the left in Germany, the higher levels of tolerance, or if one will, liberalism, appear among the Independents rather than the Democrats in the U.S. (For discussions of the neo-liberalism of Independents in American politics, see Burnham; Ladd and Hadley.) It would perhaps be better to ask why there is no association between Christian Democrats and (lack of) tolerance for an atheist speaker.
The last observation concerns the effects of time and place. While changes over time in the levels of tolerance, net of changes in related Free Speech / 987 variables, are either entirely insignificant or near zero, the two countries differ from each other in levels of tolerance in a most interesting way. First, there is much less tolerance of an atheist speaker in the U.S. than in Germany, and the gap actually widened through the 1970s: this difference fully supports the view that secularism is more widespread in Germany (and perhaps in Europe) than in the U.S. (cf. Public Opinion, 38-9) and that there has been a revival of religiosity in the U.S. in the last decade, but none comparable in Germany (as yet) (but cf. Gallup and Poling, Appendix). Second, there is considerably more tolerance for a neo-Nazi (actually, militarist/antidemocrat) speaker in the U.S. than in Germany: this difference gives no support to the view that the Germans still have protofascist leanings compared to the Americans, but it does suggest that they may be exceedingly cautious due to their recent history. 
Summary
Some analyses of West German data suggested that this country deviated from the standard patterns found in the literature on liberal democratic values, especially in the U.S. A more systematic comparison of very similar, but not identical, tolerance data for the two countries in the 1970s has substantially confirmed this impression and raised several questions, which will be addressed in the next section. The basic findings are these: Education Education is very strongly related to tolerance in the U.S., with the better educated more tolerant. This relationship holds uniformly true for each of the items of the tolerance scale, but the associations are stronger for the political than for the religious items. In contrast, there are virtually no such associations in the German data, although there is some evidence that they may have slightly emerged in the latest survey. However, this lack of association is differentially distributed among the items tested: the pattern of tolerance for an atheist speaker most resembles the American, while education has only questionable impact on tolerance of a communist speaker and none on tolerance of a neo-Nazi speaker.
Generation
The young are more tolerant than the old in both countries, but there is somewhat less evidence of true political tolerance than of secularization. Direct evidence for the U.S. and parallel evidence for Germany also suggest that the entry of new generations into the polity has been the main cause of a substantial strengthening of this association since the 1950s, and it was speculated that the greatest change probably came in the late 1960s.
Historical Change and Cross-National Differences Although we know that there has been a major increase in measured tolerance in the U.S. since the 1950s, there is no direct indication whether there has been any change in Germany in this period; however, there were no important historical changes in either country during the 1970s, despite widespread popular perceptions of rising neo-conservatism. The two countries do not differ in net level of tolerance (once the effects of other variables are taken into account) as measured by the scales; but more sensitive analysis did not support the impression gained from aggregate frequencies that the German samples displayed more net tolerance on all separate items than the American samples. Controlling for occupation, education, and generation, Germans are more tolerant than Americans of atheists, equally tolerant of communists, and less tolerant of neo-Nazis. Considering the pattern of associations found, the higher levels of aggregate tolerance in Germany are probably due to the fact that levels of tolerance among the less educated Germans resemble levels of tolerance among the better educated in both Germany and the U.S. Especially on the communist item, the worse educated in America probably bring the aggregate U.S. level below the aggregate German level.
Discussion
It will be difficult to construct a reasonable explanation for these unusual findings without going considerably beyond the data presented here. And while my other analyses do shed some light on the present findings, they cannot be presented adequately in the space available here; instead, two plausible answers will be suggested and briefly commented upon.
The first possibility is that the present results are simply an artifact of differences in question formulation. For instance, the German question text may tap only a cognitive response in Germany while the Stouffer text taps a genuine opinion in America: perhaps, as has sometimes been found
